



TGD TERRORISM MONITOR

MONTHLY SECURITY ASSESSMENT – VOL. 5

JULY 2026

Regional Threat Trends, Militant Activity,
and Counter-Terrorism Response

TRACKING THREATS. MAPPING RESPONSES. ASSESSING RISK.

FOCUS REGION: PAKISTAN–AFGHANISTAN BORDER BELT

About Us

The Global Decipher (TGD) provides in-depth, non-partisan analysis and coverage of terrorism, armed conflicts, and global security trends. By leveraging open-source intelligence, expert insights, and continuous monitoring, TGD aims to deliver accurate, timely, and actionable information to researchers, policymakers, and security professionals worldwide.



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
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**PAKISTAN MONTHLY TERRORISM &
COUNTER-TERRORISM ASSESSMENT**


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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The security landscape of July 2026 was defined by a period of acute strategic gravity, characterized by high-intensity kinetic friction and an unprecedented scale of state-led attrition. The reporting period recorded 56 civilian fatalities and 105 fatalities among security forces, police, and other law enforcement agencies. In response, the state executed an expansive counter-operation, primarily through Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and “Operation Shabaan”, resulting in the neutralization of 415 militants. This month represented a transition toward a high-attrition model of counter-insurgency, where the state sought to systematically dismantle militant capacity in the face of increasingly sophisticated and lethal non-state aggression. The following sections detail the operational specifics and tactical shifts that shaped this reporting period.


II. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

The operational theater in July 2026 underwent a fundamental shift, moving from localized skirmishes to sustained, large-scale engagements. This evolution was punctuated by the launch of “Operation Shabaan”, a comprehensive counter-terrorism operation designed to deny militants territorial sanctuary. The transition reflects a strategic pivot by the state toward proactive interdiction, forcing militant groups into higher-risk direct confrontations that characterized the month’s operational tempo.




Geographically, violence was concentrated in two primary theaters, with 83 incidents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and 45 in Balochistan. Analysis indicates that militant groups increasingly prioritized the destruction of critical infrastructure, including the Tor Kham bridge in Harnai and gas pipelines in Bannu, to create governance vacuums and disrupt state logistical lines. The fact that 48% of all targets were civilian assets, including schools and private residences, suggests an intent to disrupt civilian life and exert psychological pressure beyond purely military objectives.

Operational pressure on militant networks was particularly evident in the interdiction of infiltration attempts in Kabal (Swat) and Upper Orakzai, as well as clashes in Lower Dir and attacks on a police post in Upper Dir, where intensified security operations were reinforced by growing local resistance to renewed militant activity. In Lower Dir, three Elite Force personnel were martyred and more than 10 others injured during a major engagement, underscoring the intensity of the fighting. The conflict also expanded into maritime and transit corridors. A high-impact VBIED suicide attack targeting a Coast Guard post in Jiwani and the disruption of the N-25 highway near Lasbela signal a move toward more diverse target profiles. Notably, a single major engagement on the N-25 highway resulted in the neutralization of 14 militants, illustrating the intensity of the state's attrition-heavy response. These developments indicate a theater that is no longer confined to inland border regions but has expanded to threaten critical economic and transport infrastructure.




III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: CASUALTIES

The casualty data for July 2026 reveals an environment of heightened lethality. Terrorist violence resulted in 56 civilian fatalities, while security forces, police, and other law enforcement agencies suffered 105 fatalities and 95 injuries. The high fatality rate was significantly driven by mass-casualty terrorist attacks, including the killing of 10 police personnel and injuries to 23 others in Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the mass execution of 18 abducted police officers in the Zarghun Mountains. These incidents highlight an evolving militant operational pattern in which large-scale casualty events and post-capture executions are employed to maximize psychological impact, generate public fear, and undermine the morale of state security institutions. Coordinated ambushes, VBIED attacks, and other high-impact assaults further contributed to the overall lethality recorded during the month.



Conversely, the state's kinetic response produced a pronounced disparity in casualty ratios, with 415 militants killed compared to only 13 reported as injured. This reflects a high-attrition counterterrorism approach focused on the physical elimination of militant cells rather than their disruption or containment. However, the persistence of frequent attacks, coordinated infiltration attempts, and diversified targeting throughout the reporting period suggests that tactical success has yet to translate into decisive operational dominance.



IV. THREAT ACTORS

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadar-led Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) and targeted killing by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) maintained the lead in religious extremism, while the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) dominated the separatist insurgency. These actors demonstrated a degree of tactical mirroring, specifically in their focus on high-impact attacks and the targeting of state judicial and administrative figures.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the TTP remains the dominant actor, with the IMP concentrating its operations in North Waziristan and Bannu, with sporadic activity extending into Orakzai and Khyber districts. In Balochistan, the BLA's "Majeed Brigade" continues to carry out high-impact suicide operations, such as the assault on residence-linked targets in Khuzdar. Concurrently, ISKP (operating as ISPP) focused on exacerbating social and sectarian divisions through targeted assassinations. This was exemplified by the high-profile killing of Session Judge Abdul Hakeem Kakar in Mastung and the targeted shooting of Christian cricket players. Such operations are strategically designed to challenge the state's judicial reach and minority protection protocols. Meanwhile, the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) continues to operate in Sindh, as evidenced by CTD arrests of operatives in Karachi and Hyderabad, highlighting the group's intent to maintain an urban presence and disrupt industrial hubs.

V. PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

I. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

KPK remains the most volatile region, recording 83 incidents in July. The “Bannu-Bajaur-Lakki Marwat” triangle accounted for 40% of provincial incidents, with Bannu (18), Bajaur (9), and Lakki Marwat (6) emerging as the primary centers of gravity. This concentration reflects a concerted effort by the TTP to degrade state infrastructure, particularly government schools, which were frequently targeted with internal IED placements to maximize property damage and psychological intimidation.

A critical trend in the province is the deliberate targeting of off-duty personnel. This was evidenced not only within the primary hotspots but also in outliers like Charsadda, where an FC soldier was killed while on leave in his hometown. By targeting personnel outside of protected facilities, militants aim to disrupt local recruitment and create a pervasive sense of vulnerability. This strategy complements the TTP’s broader goal of hollowing out the state’s administrative and security presence in the southern and merged districts.

Provincial Security Assessment — Khyber Pakhtunkhwa


HIGH

KPI

Total incidents: 83

Top Hotspots: Bannu 18 | Bajaur 9 | Lakki Marwat 6

Top 3 share: 33/83 (40%)




[Drone] Drone [IED] IED/VBIED [Targeted] Targeted
[Clash] Clash [Arson] Arson [Ops] Ops

Reporting period: July 2026

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II. Balochistan

Balochistan recorded 45 incidents, with Quetta (7) and Mastung (5) serving as primary urban targets. The security environment was largely dictated by the state's proactive stance under



“Operation Shabaan”. While the initial phases of the operation saw over 79 terrorists neutralized, the campaign became the primary driver for the province's total 415 militant losses, illustrating the sheer scale of the state's high-attrition offensive against BLA and TTP cells in the region.

Despite these losses, insurgent groups demonstrated resilience by targeting economic assets and transit corridors. The destruction of the Tor Kham bridge in Harnai and the temporary blockade of highways for propaganda purposes highlight a strategy of economic sabotage. However, the consistent pressure from air and ground assets, including

the use of advanced stand-off technology, has restricted insurgent freedom of movement and forced them into higher-risk, direct engagements with security forces.

III. Gilgit Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan maintained a posture of comparative stability with no major kinetic incidents in July, though security forces remained vigilant against spillover from neighboring KPK districts.

IV. Punjab and Sindh

In Sindh, the security posture remained defensive but successful, with CTD arrests in Karachi and Hyderabad neutralizing BLA and SRA cells before they could execute urban strikes. In Punjab, no kinetic incidents were reported, as the provincial security apparatus focused on proactive interdiction of spillover cells attempting to transition into the provincial interior from the western theater.

VI. TACTICS

Tactical adaptations in July 2026 reveal a clear effort by militant groups to reduce physical exposure while maximizing the psychological impact of their operations. This shift is a direct response to the high attrition rates inflicted by state Intelligence-Based Operations. Militant methodology is increasingly favoring hit-and-run lethality over attempts at territorial control. The tactical breakdown shows

“Armed Clash/Ambush” as the dominant method at 48%, followed by “IED/Explosives” at 21%. Of significant strategic concern is the evolution in technological capability, with 10 recorded “Drone/Stand-off”

incidents (11%). However, this technological evolution is a two-way street; security forces demonstrated their own adaptation by deploying an Armed Quadcopter to target a militant gathering point in Khuzdar. This reciprocal use of stand-off technology indicates that the conflict is entering a phase of technological mirroring, where both state and non-state actors leverage aerial assets to maximize precision and reduce personnel risk.



Militant Tactics & Operational Breakdown

National Security Assessment — July 2026

HIGH

TOTAL
89

Primary Tactic: Armed Clash / Ambush (43 incidents | 48%)



Reporting period: July 2026

VII. KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **Technological Evolution:** The conflict is defined by reciprocal technological adaptation; while the TTP has increased quadcopter usage for surveillance and strikes, the state has countered with its own Armed Quadcopters (AQC's), as seen in the Khuzdar interdiction.
- **Militants Adaptation:** Despite the neutralization of 415 terrorists, terror groups maintained operational continuity by relying on dispersed attacks, sabotage, targeted killings, and soft-target attacks instead of holding terrain.
- **Militant Landscape:** While the TTP and BLA remained the principal perpetrators of violence, Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) also demonstrated operational activity through targeted attacks, highlighting the persistence of a multi-actor militant threat.
- **Infrastructure Sabotage:** High-impact attacks on gas pipelines and the Tor Kham bridge, alongside the maritime targeting of the Coast Guard in Jiwani, reflect a concerted strategy to undermine economic connectivity and state logistics.
- **Local Resistance as a Force Multiplier:** Events in Swat and Lower Dir demonstrated that growing community resistance, alongside intensified security operations, increasingly constrained militant infiltration and freedom of movement. The killing of four Village Defence Committee (VDC) members from the same family in the Shalkho Sar area during operations alongside police highlighted both the sacrifices made by local communities and their growing importance as a force multiplier in counterterrorism efforts.



This report is based on open-source data, and every effort has been made to ensure accuracy; however, information may be subject to revision. For feedback or inquiries, please contact The Global Decipher (TGD) through its official channels.

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