

TGD Monthly Terrorism Report — Vol. 1

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Counter-Terrorism Assessment

Issue: January 2026

AFGHANISTAN

ISLAMABAD

LAHORE

PAKISTAN



About Us

The Global Decipher (TGD) provides in-depth, non-partisan analysis and coverage of terrorism, armed conflicts, and global security trends. By leveraging open-source intelligence, expert insights, and continuous monitoring, TGD aims to deliver accurate, timely, and actionable information to researchers, policymakers, and security professionals worldwide.



REPORT COMPILED BY

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The data presented in this report were obtained from open-source materials and through continuous monitoring of the security situation on a daily basis. Efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, and this report does not include unverified or speculative claims.

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SECTION I

***PAKISTAN MONTHLY SECURITY & COUNTER-
TERRORISM ASSESSMENT***



I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The internal security apparatus of Pakistan faced a multifaceted threat landscape in January 2026, characterized by high-intensity asymmetric engagements across the western borderlands. This report period covers terrorist incidents from January 1st to January 29th based on open source data. A total of 158 security-related incidents were documented, indicating an elevated operational tempo by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the northwest and Baloch ethno-nationalist insurgents (BLA/BLF) in the southwest. The number of incidents also includes intelligence-led operations against militants' hideouts. During the reporting period, 151 militants were killed in multiple security forces' Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and different engagements across the country. However, the overall threat environment remained largely unchanged, with militant violence continuing at a steady pace throughout the reporting period.

II. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

Over the course of January 2026, militant incidents in Pakistan were heavily concentrated in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), across the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs), and in the Balochistan districts of Wadh, Panjgur, Sibbi, Awaran, and Kech, with the majority of attacks targeting security forces, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure. Early-month activity in Balochistan involved BLA/BLF groups carrying out ambushes, targeted killings, and infrastructure sabotage, including attacks on CPEC-linked roads and bridges. By mid-January, operational activity shifted to southern KP, where Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated elements leveraged urban-fringe areas to conduct IED attacks, targeted killings, and assaults on peace committees and civilians. Militant groups are increasingly using quadcopter drones, and the TTP has institutionalized this trend by announcing an "Air Force" that consists not of conventional aircraft but of quadcopter drones primarily for surveillance and attack operations. The deployment of weaponized drones and advanced IEDs demonstrates a tactical and technological escalation, while repeated attacks on bridges, pipelines, and communication infrastructure indicate a calculated effort to disrupt state response and local governance.

Security forces responded with multiple Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and CTD-led interventions, successfully neutralizing dozens of militants, including high-value operatives, in KP and Balochistan. Despite these tactical gains, the continued prevalence of low-intensity attacks, abductions, and targeted strikes on symbolic and civilian targets highlights the resilience and adaptability of militant networks. The January 2026 trends emphasize the need for enhanced intelligence integration, critical infrastructure protection, community-based resilience measures, and counter-drone capabilities. Overall, a multi-layered, intelligence-driven, and community-focused counterterrorism strategy remains essential to mitigate both kinetic and non-kinetic threats across Pakistan.

III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: CASUALTIES

During this period, a total of 138 casualties were recorded, including 56 fatalities and 82 injuries. Among law enforcement personnel, 18 personnel lost their lives, and 12 were injured, while security forces personnel suffered 15 fatalities and 14 injuries. Civilians accounted for 17 deaths and 53 injuries, and peace committee/local defense members experienced 6 fatalities and 3 injuries. A total of 82 casualties among civilians and security actors resulted from IEDs, targeted shootings, and indiscriminate attacks. Collectively, these figures highlight the human cost of the period's violence, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accounting for most fatalities, while Balochistan continued to experience frequent but variably reported attacks.

Counterterrorism and intelligence-based operations conducted during the reporting period resulted in the killing of at least 135 militants, the injury of 26 others, and the arrest of 15 suspects across multiple areas. Overall, at least 150 militants were either killed or apprehended, reflecting the scale and intensity of security forces' operational response to the prevailing threat environment. The operations comprised a mix of intelligence-led actions and armed engagements, undertaken to disrupt militant networks and neutralize hostile elements during active confrontations

The Human Toll: January 2026


Total affected: 139 | Fatalities: 56 | Injuries: 82 | Abductions: 1



Militant Losses — January 2026

Total: 176

Key: Killed: 135 | Injured: 26 | Arrested: 15



IV. THREAT ACTORS


Most attacks were carried out by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which dominated operations in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Bajaur, and Kurram. Many attacks in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Bannu were claimed by both TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadar (HGB)-led Ittehad al Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), indicating overlapping operational presence in these areas. HGB and IMP focused primarily on Bannu and North Waziristan. The

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) conducted targeted assassinations, focusing on religious figures affiliated with JUI-F in South Waziristan and an MML candidate in Bajaur. Baloch nationalist groups, including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), carried out sporadic attacks across Balochistan districts. The Baloch Republican Guards (BRG)

attempted to target the Jaffar Express on three occasions but were unsuccessful. A notable number of attacks remained unattributed, largely consisting of quadcopter drone strikes, reflecting selective militant activity and persistent challenges in accurately identifying perpetrators.

THREAT ACTOR FREQUENCY


January 2026 | Total incidents (122)



V. PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT


1. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Bannu experienced the highest intensity of violence during this reporting period, with a high concentration of recorded incidents. These included drone strikes targeting police infrastructure, multiple IED attacks on convoys, and targeted killings of police officials. Notable incidents also involved abductions followed by summary executions and the strategic destruction of key connecting bridges to isolate administrative centers. This trend extended into Lakki Marwat and the Waziristan districts, where militants targeted the private residences of law enforcement officers and engaged in the kidnapping of strategic project personnel to halt federal initiatives. The comparative distribution of incidents across these districts highlights the southern belt of KP as the primary hotspot for militant activity.



II. Balochistan

In Balochistan, the districts of Panjgur, Kech, and Awaran recorded significant kinetic activity centered on infrastructure sabotage and high-yield explosives. Insurgent groups focused on degrading the CPEC-linked transit network, damaging multiple bridges and targeting security details assigned to mining and development projects. These operations utilized the province's low-density highway networks to execute ambushes on military convoys and mobile



patrols. The tactical shift toward "economic denial" was evidenced by the repeated targeting of logistical lines, aiming to increase the operational cost for state-led economic projects in the region.

III. Punjab and Sindh

The districts of Mianwali, Karachi, and Lahore functioned primarily as logistical transit points rather than active kinetic theaters. However, the detection and disruption of militant cells in Mianwali indicate a persistent threat of spillover from the neighboring KP conflict zones. In Karachi, security measures remained focused on the prevention of targeted strikes against financial assets and foreign interests. While incident frequency remained low in these regions, the clandestine presence of militant elements necessitates sustained surveillance of fundraising and long-term planning activities that support the operational surges observed in the western borderlands.

VI. Tactics


Targeted attacks and armed assault remained the dominant tactic, accounting for 45 percent of incidents throughout the month, followed by IED attacks, including vehicle-borne, motorcycle, and planted devices. These

explosives were strategically deployed against moving convoys and static checkpoints to maximize state attrition. A drone-assisted attack in Bannu, although non-lethal, reflects a significant increase in operational sophistication and the adoption of off-the-shelf technology for surveillance and delivery. Infrastructure

sabotage, particularly repeated attacks on bridges and road links in both KP and Balochistan, aimed to disrupt state mobility and cripple local logistics, effectively isolating remote administrative outposts.

VII. State Response

Throughout January, security forces and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) sustained a high-intensity counter-terrorism campaign characterized by Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and large-scale sanitization efforts. A total of 64 militants were neutralized and 18 apprehended. A defining engagement occurred on January 29 in the Domel tehsil of Bannu, specifically in the Sparka and Akbar Ali Khan Kili areas. Furthermore, forty-one militants were killed in Balochistan on 29 January 2026, in which thirty terrorists were killed in Harnai, while 11 were killed in Panjgur. This joint operation by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and police



involved over 25 quadcopter strikes and 10 hours of heavy firefights, resulting in the elimination of 5 terrorists, including a key commander identified as Zewaran alias Al-Badri.

Additional significant IBOs were recorded earlier in the month, including the neutralization of 11 militants in North Waziristan and Kurram on January 10. In Balochistan, a major engagement in Kharan City on January 16 saw security forces thwart a hostage situation at a police station and bank robbery attempt, killing 12 militants. Further operations in Kalat (Jan 13), Mastung (Jan 19), and Panjgur (Jan 25) effectively disrupted cells planning to block the Quetta-Sibi Highway. These proactive state actions, alongside successful IED defusals and the interception of VBIEDs, demonstrate a robust and coordinated response to the evolving insurgent tactics, though they came at the cost of 42 martyred state personnel.

VIII. Overall Threat Assessment:

1. THREAT LEVEL: HIGH

The threat level is assessed as HIGH. Pakistan's internal security apparatus faced a sustained and multifaceted operational tempo, with 158 recorded security-related incidents nationwide. Asymmetric engagements remained high-intensity, particularly in the western borderlands of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. The violence resulted in 138 total casualties, including 56 fatalities, of which 33 were security and law enforcement personnel. The neutralization of 135 militants in various armed engagements reflects a sustained kinetic campaign, primarily composed of intelligence-based operations. The continued frequency of attacks indicates that militant violence is likely to persist and that militant groups retain the capability to coordinate complex assaults.

2. PRIORITY HOTSPOTS

Militant activity was heavily concentrated in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and selected districts of Balochistan, which together accounted for the majority of the 158 recorded incidents. Bannu emerged as the most volatile district with 24 incidents, marked by drone strikes on police lines, targeted killings of officials, and the destruction of key connecting bridges. North Waziristan followed with 22 incidents, characterized by direct clashes, ambushes, and IED attacks. Lakki Marwat also saw intense activity with 18 incidents, including repeated attacks on police infrastructure and targeted assaults on peace committees and local communities resisting militant influence. In Balochistan, Panjgur (8 incidents) and Kech (6 incidents) served as focal points of the Baloch insurgent campaign, with militants specifically targeting CPEC-linked infrastructure and security convoys assigned to protect development projects.

3. KEY ASSESSMENTS

A. High Threat Environment: Technological & Tactical Escalation

The threat environment has evolved beyond conventional guerrilla tactics. The most alarming development is the technological escalation by the TTP, which has institutionalized an "Air

Force” of weaponized commercial drones. These platforms are now being used for surveillance and to drop payloads on static targets, enabling militants to bypass traditional perimeter defenses. Furthermore, the increasing use of sophisticated IEDs has heightened the risk to security force convoys.

B. Targeting of Security Actors

Law enforcement and security personnel remain the primary targets of militant violence, bearing the brunt of the fatalities with a combined total of **33 fatalities** (18 Law Enforcement, 15 Security Forces). Militants have increasingly utilized sniper attacks ("laser guns") and IEDs against mobile patrols to maximize attrition. A particularly disturbing trend observed during this period involved the abduction and target killing of police officials, a tactic intended to demoralize the force.

C. ISKP Sectarian Threat

The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) continues to pose a potent, albeit selective, sectarian and ideological threat. Operations were narrowly focused on targeted assassinations of religious scholars and political figures affiliated with JUI-F in South Waziristan and an MML candidate in Bajaur. These attacks are calculated to trigger intra-religious conflict and destabilize the social fabric by eliminating figures who oppose ISKP's hardline Salafist interpretation.

D. Impact of CT Operations


The state kinetic response, with Intelligence-Based Operations, killed 135 militants and arrested 15 across the country. Key operations disrupted cells in Mianwali, Panjgur, Harnai, North Waziristan, and Kurram, and prevented a hostage-taking and bank robbery in Kharan, while actions in Kalat, Mastung, and along the Quetta–Sibi Highway further hindered militant plans. Despite these efforts, militant violence persists, highlighting the extensive networks that continue to support recruitment and sustain militant operations.

SECTION II

MONITORING DESK

Tracking Regional Militant Groups' Propaganda






1. Monitoring Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS):

i. Introduction

Since suffering leadership losses in the Global War on Terror, AQIS has largely shifted from operational activity to online ideological indoctrination, relying primarily on propaganda campaigns. In the latest issue of AQIS's Urdu flagship magazine, *Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind*, AQIS frames a tightly curated propaganda narrative. Its themes range from ideological indoctrination and selective religious interpretation to glorification of militant struggle, victimhood narratives, and moral absolutism. By blending doctrinal claims with emotive language, historical grievance, and promises of honor or salvation, the magazine constructs a worldview that delegitimizes alternative perspectives while normalizing violence as duty. The coverage appears comprehensive—spiritual, ideological, political, social, and military—reinforcing in-group identity, discouraging critical thought, and presenting the movement as the sole authentic representative of faith and resistance.

ii. Focus on Pakistan: Ideological Messaging

The magazine urges unity among Pakistani militants, warning that disunity will ultimately destroy them. While the message is general, it may also implicitly address tensions and potential rifts within regional militant factions. By framing unity as both a moral and operational imperative, AQIS positions itself as a guiding authority, reinforcing loyalty among supporters, discouraging infighting, and promoting cohesion across the broader jihadist landscape.



The magazine also engages with the ongoing ideological debate over Jihad and democracy in Pakistan. Responding to public remarks questioning traditional jihadist references and defending participation in democracy, AQIS clarified in *Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind* that it does not use specific Hadiths as benchmarks for right and wrong, and it opposes attacks on religious individuals participating in democratic processes. While AQIS maintains that Western democracy cannot be Islamic, it presents itself as ideologically principled, condemning intra-Muslim violence and emphasizing moral boundaries within militant action.



iii. Regional Politics: Israel, Somaliland, and the UAE:

The magazine reacted to Israeli recognition of Somaliland, arguing that Zionists now control the global financial system and strategic locations, enabling them to project influence across the Middle East and Africa. The article argued that this development would facilitate Israeli attacks on Yemen through bases in Somaliland. It also criticized the UAE, labeling it a puppet of Israel and condemning its support for regional armed groups. These narratives link regional geopolitics with AQIS's ideological framing, portraying foreign actors as adversaries of Islam while situating AQIS as a knowledgeable and vigilant authority on international affairs.



iv. International: Bondi Beach Attack Endorsement

AQIS expressed support for the attack on Jews at Bondi Beach in Sydney, describing it as “retaliation for Gaza by a Muslim father and son motivated by faith and honor.” Ideologue Qazi Abu Ahmad characterized the attack as “a religiously honorable act and an expression of bravery,” signaling AQIS's endorsement of international acts of violence framed as religious and ideological duty. This messaging connects local and global struggles, legitimizing violence as morally justified and divinely sanctioned.



v. Conclusion:

Overall, the magazine strategically blends ideological, political, and emotive narratives to reinforce group identity, legitimize violence, and delegitimize opposing actors. By addressing local dynamics in Pakistan, regional developments in the Middle East and Africa, and international attacks, AQIS presents itself as a comprehensive authority on ideological and operational jihadist thought. Simultaneously, it frames foreign adversaries as threats and normalizes militant action as a moral and religious obligation. Through this multi-layered approach, AQIS strengthens loyalty among sympathizers, consolidates influence across networks, and positions itself as the central and credible voice for resistance, combining ideological coherence with operational guidance. Furthermore, the group has spreading intensified propaganda across various social media platforms such as X (formerly twitter),

Facebook, TikTok, glorifying the Afghan Taliban rule and also supporting the Pakistani Taliban so called jihad in Pakistan.

2. Monitoring Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)

i. Ideological Messaging

The 13th issue of ISKP's Urdu-language publication places strong emphasis on the concept of "Financial Jihad," framing financial support as a religious obligation equivalent to physical participation in jihad. This narrative broadens the definition of participation, enabling supporters who cannot engage directly in violence to contribute materially, thereby strengthening organizational sustainability. The publication remains silent on recent internal developments, reflecting a selective information strategy aimed at maintaining morale and ideological cohesion. It also praises violence against religious figures critical of ISKP, portraying such actions as necessary for ideological enforcement and signaling zero tolerance for dissenting religious interpretations.



ii. Promoting Inspirational Attacks:



The publication glorifies the Bondi Beach attack in Sydney and encourages supporters to conduct similar attacks in Western countries. The group is developing a new strategic approach by using extensive propaganda to influence individuals to carry out inspirational attacks. By promoting decentralized and low-cost violence, ISKP seeks to inspire lone-actor or small-cell operations beyond its immediate operational theater. This messaging reinforces ISKP's transnational ambitions, portraying international attacks as both feasible and religiously justified, while sustaining

relevance within the broader global jihadist narrative.

iii. Undermining Rival Militant Groups

ISKP strongly criticizes rival militant organizations, depicting them as ideologically compromised, ineffective, or overly pragmatic. At the same time, the publication actively appeals to supporters of these groups, urging them to defect and align with ISKP. This dual strategy serves to undermine competitors while positioning ISKP as the most ideologically rigid and uncompromising alternative. By combining denunciation with recruitment outreach, ISKP seeks to



consolidate influence and attract disillusioned militants from across the regional militant landscape.

iv. Conclusion

Overall, the publication reflects a deliberate and layered propaganda strategy that integrates ideological indoctrination, operational encouragement, and competitive positioning. The emphasis on financial jihad expands participation, the endorsement of international attacks reinforces global ambition, and the delegitimization of rivals supports recruitment and consolidation. Collectively, these narratives do not merely promote cohesion but actively normalize violence, instrumentalize religion, and externalize risk onto supporters, reinforcing ISKP's dependence on propaganda-driven radicalization rather than sustainable operational capability.

3. Monitoring Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP):

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has expanded its propaganda outreach beyond traditional Pakistani domestic languages to include Bengali and Russian. This shift indicates that the group is no longer merely a domestic threat, but increasingly a transnational one, as reflected in the participation of Bengali nationals within its ranks and the arrest of TTP affiliates in Dhaka in July 2025. In the latest Pashto-language flagship magazine, the group opens with strong religious framing, relying on Islamic ideology and references to faith and jihad to establish moral authority and discourage questioning. This framing sets the tone for the entire publication and is used to legitimize all subsequent claims. The magazine revisits the past seven years of so-called jihad, border closures, annual attack claims, and future organizational planning for 2026, selectively emphasizing endurance and continuity while omitting operational losses, internal pressures, and strategic setbacks.



i. Criticism of the State and Messaging to Supporters

A significant portion of the content focuses on criticism of the state, economy, and military, portraying Pakistan as acting in Western interests, including allegations related to Gaza-linked diplomacy. These claims are presented without evidence and function primarily to externalize blame for the group's failures. The repeated emphasis



on moral legitimacy, sacrifice, and resilience is aimed at justifying sustained violence, normalizing hardship among supporters, and maintaining loyalty rather than offering any realistic political or strategic alternative.

ii. Regional and Recruitment Outreach

The magazine functions as a controlled propaganda product rather than an informational outlet. TTP has expanded content into the Bengali language, including translated videos, claims, and magazine content, signaling an effort to reach audiences in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi authorities report multiple arrests of individuals linked to TTP, and at least 25–30 Bangladeshis are currently identified in Pakistan participating in militant activity across several groups, including TTP, TLP, and IMP. At least four Bangladeshis have already been confirmed killed while fighting for TTP. These developments indicate that the Bengali-language content is directly tied to recruitment and operational mobilization, not just passive propaganda. The group's multilingual outreach demonstrates an attempt to expand regional influence, consolidate support, and facilitate cross-border fighter flows, highlighting TTP's transnational reach and ongoing recruitment risks.



iii. Conclusion

The criticism of the state and military in the latest issue of the Pashto language magazine and addressing issues of critical discussion nowadays aimed at fueling further distrust between people of state institutions, while at the same time presenting themselves as the rightful authority. TTP's evolving propaganda and recruitment strategy shows a clear shift from a largely domestic insurgent group toward a more outward-facing, transnational actor. By expanding its messaging into languages such as Bengali and Russian, TTP is actively seeking new audiences and embedding itself in wider regional networks. Together, these trends indicate that TTP's threat is no longer confined to Pakistan but is increasingly regional in scope, requiring monitoring and counter-extremism responses that address both its ideological messaging and its cross-border recruitment and mobilization networks.





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